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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case.  
This case concerns (a) whether a secured creditor should recover twice for the same debt 
despite the damage such ruling would do to the integrity of the non-judicial foreclosure process; 
and (b) whether that same secured creditor—if it later voluntarily stipulates and elects to give up 
its security interest in other collateral—can still nevertheless recover for the alleged loss of that 
other collateral. 
Appellant, First Bank of Lincoln (hereinafter “First Bank”) at its foreclosure sale of the 
Hotel Lincoln in Lincoln, Montana attended by the bank President made a successful full credit 
bid in 2014 and received that property.  Now, First Bank seeks protection from itself, saying it 
accidentally over bid at that foreclosure sale and that the very debt that formed the basis for its 
full credit bid is still owed.  The Full Credit Bid Rule exists for the common sense reason that no 
creditor is entitled to a double recovery of the same debt, as that would be an unjustified 
windfall.  The Full Credit Bid Rule also preserves the integrity of the non-judicial foreclosure 
sale process, ensuring that secured creditors only bid the fair market value of the property, and 
that other parties who must make cash bids at such sales are not wasting their time.  Otherwise, 
why would a sophisticated bank creditor ever do anything than simply bid the full amount of its 
debt regardless of how little the collateral was actually worth?  The foreclosure sale process 
would be rendered a sham, a mere excuse simply to turn over collateral to the secured creditor. 
Further, alternative grounds besides the Full Credit Bid Rule justify the decision below.  
In 2016, First Bank vindicated its position in Washington state court that its second deed of trust 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 2 
still encumbered a bowling alley property in Washington State. But inexplicably, having 
achieved that ruling on appeal, First Bank voluntarily stipulated to release its second deed of 
trust and dismiss that case. Having done so, First Bank  made an election of remedies, and that 
doctrine as well as the doctrines of judicial estoppel and quasi estoppel now bar First Bank from 
bringing the present lawsuit, as the central tenet of this lawsuit is Respondent’s, Land Title of 
Nez Perce County, Inc. (hereinafter “Land Title”), conduct rendered valueless the bowling alley 
collateral.  On the contrary, First Bank voluntarily released that collateral. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
First Bank filed the Complaint in the present Idaho action against Land Title on 
November 29, 2016.1  The Complaint alleges (1) Negligence; (2) Third-Party Beneficiary; 
(3) Specific Performance; and (4) Equitable Estoppel.  The Complaint alleges that First Bank 
“suffered damages in the amount of original loan . . . , less the fair-market value of the Hotel 
Lincoln.”2 
Land Title filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 19, 2017.3  However, prior to 
that date for hearing, First Bank file a Motion for a Continuance for Summary Judgment Briefing 
Schedule and Hearing Date.4  The basis for the continuance was that the Montana First Judicial 
District Court in a separate proceeding instituted by First Bank regarding the obligation on this 
                                                 
1 R. 2.  An amended Complaint was later filed on 12/4/2017, but the changes were relatively 
minor.  R. 235. 
2 R. 241 and 242, paras. 4.7 and 5.7.   
3 R. 145-46. 
4 R. 43-45. 
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debt had set a hearing on cross motions for summary judgment on August 16, 2017.5  On July 
19, 2017, without hearing, the District Court granted the Motion for Continuance.6  On July 19, 
2017, First Bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration of that order, as well as opposition to the 
Motion for Continuance.7  A telephonic hearing was held on August 10, 2017, on the 
reconsideration.8  At the hearing on the Motion for Continuance, the Court indicated that it 
would still grant the continuance but that if there was no ruling by the first of November, Land 
Title could re-notice its hearing on its Motion for Summary Judgment.9  Land Title re-noticed its 
hearing on its Motion for Summary Judgment on November 3, 2017.10  A hearing was set on 
January 25, 2018, on that Motion for Summary Judgment.11  First Bank filed its own Motion for 
Summary Judgment on January 2, 2018.12  The District Court held a hearing and entered an 
Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Judgment on March 22, 2018.13  That Order 
granted Land Title’s Motion for Summary Judgment based on the Full Credit Bid Rule.  Final 
Judgment was entered in the case on April 3, 2018.14  A Notice of Appeal of that decision was 
timely filed on April 30, 2018.  On July 30, 2018, First Bank filed a Motion for Suspension 
before this Court seeking to suspend the appeal to await an alleged anticipated ruling in the 
                                                 
5 R. 43-44. 
6 R. 147-48. 
7 R. 159-62. 
8 R. 189. 
9 R. 192. 
10 R. 193. 
11 R. 231. 
12 R. 265, 290. 
13 R. 647-53. 
14 R. 655. 
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aforementioned Montana District Court action.  On August 20, 2018, this Court entered its Order 
Denying Motion for Suspension, and this appeal proceeded forward. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Around January 27, 2011, First Bank loaned $440,000.00 to Donald Tuschoff 
(“Tuschoff”), in connection with his purchase of the Hotel Lincoln in Lincoln, Montana (“Hotel 
Lincoln”). Tuschoff signed a promissory note, secured by a deed of trust against the Hotel 
Lincoln Property (“Hotel Lincoln DOT”).15 As additional collateral, Tuschoff also executed an 
assignment of his beneficial interest in a Washington state deed of trust.  The Washington state 
deed of trust was on a bowling alley in Clarkston, Washington, which Tuschoff financed and 
sold to a group of investors known as “Schwab” resulting in a promissory note 
(“Schwab/Tuschoff Note”) and deed of trust (“Bowling Alley DOT”).16   
In June 2013, Schwab in turn sold the bowling alley to a buyer, Banana Belt Gaming, 
LLC (“Banana Belt”). 17  First American Title Company (“First American”) handled the closing 
of that sale.18  Defendant Land Title of Nez Perce County (“Land Title”) was contacted by First 
American because Land Title had been servicing the payments due on the Schwab/Tuschoff 
Note as part of a long-term escrow contract.  Land Title attempted to secure the necessary 
                                                 
15 R. 123, 13, 55-59, 61-70.  All factual citations to the record in this brief by Land Title are 
simply citations to the record in the case on summary judgment for purposes of this appeal.  
Land Title by so citing in no way stipulates to said facts as accurate or releases any right to 
contest the facts as established in any future proceedings in this case in the event that this Court 
does not uphold the District Judge’s summary judgment ruling in favor of Land Title. 
16 R. 13, 72-76. 
17 R. 13.   
18 Id. 
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request for reconveyance by Tuschoff as well as to come up with a payoff amount due on the 
Schwab/Tuschoff Note for the closing.19  However, Land Title failed to obtain a reconveyance 
from Tuschoff.20 The closing and sale to Banana Belt occurred, and funds were paid by First 
American to Land Title for the payoff of the Schwab/Tuschoff Note and Bowling Alley DOT 
and those funds were then disbursed by Land Title to Tuschoff around that time.21 
Subsequent to the closing of the sale, during February 2014, First Bank contacted Land 
Title as part of an annual loan review and learned that the bowling alley property had been sold 
and the funds had not been disbursed to First Bank.22  Thereafter, First Bank filed the first of 
what ultimately would be four lawsuits over this dispute.  The first lawsuit was a lawsuit in 
Montana against Tuschoff and his daughter, Laurie Tuschoff, a co-signator on the original Note, 
filed on April 23, 2014 (and that lawsuit continues today).23  On the same date, April 23, 2014, 
First Bank also instituted a suit in Washington State against the Tuschoffs, as well as the ultimate 
purchaser of the bowling alley, Banana Belt (the “First Washington Lawsuit”).24  The relief 
sought in the Complaint filed in the First Washington Lawsuit included a “Declaration that [First 
Bank]’s Deed of Trust remains a lien on the subject land [bowling alley in Washington].25  After 
a decision by a Washington appellate court in the First Washington Lawsuit, and a stipulated 
                                                 
19 R. 14-15. 
20 R. 437. 
21 R. 15. 
22 R. 16, 78-80. 
23 Affidavit of Thomas E. Dvorak in Support of Opposition to Appellant’s Motion for 
Suspension filed August 9, 2018 (“Dvorak Aff.”) at Ex. A. 
24 R. 82-85. 
25 R. 84. 
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dismissal of that lawsuit, First Bank then instituted a second Washington lawsuit, now against 
First American, case no. CV 16-2-00030 (the “Second Washington Lawsuit”),26 and First Bank 
also instituted the Complaint in the present action, a Complaint which mirrored in many ways the 
Second Washington Lawsuit.27 
As part of its collection efforts, First Bank, acting through its attorney, KD Feeback, who 
was also appointed as a Montana non-judicial sale trustee by First Bank, held a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale for the Hotel Lincoln on August 25, 2014 (“Hotel Lincoln Foreclosure Sale”).28  
The Notice of Trustee’s Sale of Real Property setting the sale for that date stated: 
THE SUM OWING ON THE OBLIGATION SECURED 
BY THE TRUST INDENTURE AS OF April 23, 2014 IS: 
 
Remaining Principal Balance:  $ 400,430.42 
Escrow Due:  $ 0.00 
Late Charges:  $ 50.00 
Delinquent Interest:* $ 1,055.94 
 
*(accrued against the Principal Balance at the rate of 6% percent 
per annum, which interest continues to accrue at $65.9957 per day)  
Other: All unpaid balances, including taxes and insurance, 
together with all necessary and reasonable expenses incurred 
in collection, including trustees' and attorneys' fees, and all 
costs and fees incurred for a foreclosure report, publication, 
posting and recording. 
 
THE BENEFICIARY HAS ELECTED AND DIRECTED 
IN WRITING THAT THE SUCCESSOR TRUSTEE SELL THE 
REAL PROPERTY ABOVE DESCRIBED TO SATISFY THE 
AFORESAID OBLIGATIONS. 
. . . 
                                                 
26 R. 430. 
27 R. 498-500 (comparing these two complaints). 
28 R. 16. 
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The Successor Trustee or his attorney will sell the real 
property at public auction to the highest bidder. This sale is a 
public sale and any person, including the Beneficiary (excepting 
only the Successor Trustee), may bid at the sale. The bid price 
must be paid in cash and conveyance will be made by a Trustee's 
Deed. . . . 29 
It is undisputed that First Bank made a credit bid at that foreclosure sale of all amounts due and 
owing to First Bank (the “Full Credit Bid”).30  A local reporter at that sale reported: 
[The Trustee] Feeback opened the auction with the bank’s credit 
bid of $425,748.50, which he explained represented the 
outstanding principle [sic], interest, costs, property taxes and legal 
fees for the foreclosure.   
 
Feeback then asked if anyone was willing to pay more for the 
building.  Hearing no response, he said “I guess in the vernacular 
of an auctioneer, which I ain’t, that’s the functional equivalent of 
‘going once, going twice, sold to the bank’.”31  
  
The President of First Bank, Kenny Martin, was present at the sale.32  The Trustee’s Deed recited 
that First Bank “has paid the purchase price due on the sale by credit bid.” 33  Placing a credit bid 
was consistent with the Hotel Lincoln DOT, which also mandated application of the proceeds by 
the Trustee to the debt owed to First Bank, in this case, to payment in full of the debt owed: 
Upon sale of the property and to the extent not prohibited by law, 
Trustee will apply the proceeds of the Property’s sale in the 
following order: to all fees, charges and costs, including those for 
expenses the power of sale and reasonable Trustee’s fees and 
reasonable attorney’s fees; to Lender for all moneys advances 
made for the repairs, taxes, insurance, liens, assessments and prior 
                                                 
29 R. 90 (emphasis added). 
30 R. 99-103. 
31 R. 103, 299-300. 
32 R. 102. 
33 R. 99. 
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encumbrances and interests thereon; to the Secured Debt’s 
principal and interest; and paying any surplus as required by law. 
Lender or its designee may purchase the Property.34 
 
The First Washington Lawsuit proceeded all the way to the Court of Appeals in the State 
of Washington.  In a published decision entered on April 14, 2016, Division 3 of the Court of 
Appeals of Washington ruled in favor of First Bank, holding that the assignment was effective, 
that the Bowling Alley DOT remained valid and enforceable, and remanding for further 
proceedings.  First Bank of Lincoln v. Tuschoff and Banana Belt Gaming, LLC, 375 P.3d 687 
(Wash. App. 2016).  In that case, the Washington court characterized the proceedings as follows 
(and did not know that a full credit bid had in fact been made been made): 
First Bank sued Tuschoff and Banana Belt in Asotin County 
Superior Court, seeking a declaratory judgment that Tuschoff’s 
assignment of his beneficial interest in the [Bowling Alley DOT] 
remained a valid lien against the bowling alley property. 
First Bank held a nonjudicial foreclosure sale for the Hotel Lincoln 
property on August 25, 2014. First Bank was the only bidder at the 
trustee’s sale, and successfully purchased the property. First Bank 
asserts that a $250,000 balance will remain unpaid in connection 
with the Montana note after First Bank liquidates the Hotel Lincoln 
property. First Bank never disclosed during discovery the amount 
it bid at the trustee’s sale to reacquire Hotel Lincoln. 
Id. at 692 (emphasis added).  However, since the Washington court did not know that a full 
credit bid had been made (resulting in no deficiency judgment being possible), the Washington 
court engaged in an analysis of whether any deficiency judgment was even allowed under 
Montana law.  Id. at 694.  It first noted that the Montana code did not seem on its face to allow a 
                                                 
34 R. 65 (emphasis added). 
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deficiency in any kind of non-judicial foreclosure of any type of real property, residential or 
commercial.  Id.   
However, the Washington appellate court went on to give, in an unpublished portion of 
its opinion, a discourse on Montana’s anti-deficiency statute.  In that recitation, the court first 
said that it appeared under Montana law that no deficiency judgments were allowed in a non-
judicial foreclosure.  The court then went on to say that it was not clear to the Washington court 
what Montana law was on this issue and that the Washington Court was “tak[ing] the unusual 
step of declining to answer a dispositive issue, but instead requir[ing] Banana Belt to file suit in 
Montana so a Montana court can answer the dispositive issue.  Only if the Montana court 
determines that First Bank is entitled to a deficiency judgment, it will also need to determine the 
amount of the judgment, which will require resolution of how much First Bank bid to purchase 
the Hotel Lincoln at foreclosure.”  Id. at 694.  The court went on to say that the trial court on 
remand was to  
[S]tay further proceedings for Banana Belt to file suit in Montana.  
We deem it would be prudent for a Montana court to determine 
whether First Bank has a right to a deficiency judgment on its 
promissory note with Tuschoff following its election to foreclose 
against the Hotel Lincoln by advertisement and sale, and if so, the 
amount of the deficiency judgment. 
If the Montana court determines First Bank has no right to a 
deficiency judgment against Tuschoff, the trial court is directed to 
enter judgment in favor of Banana Belt and to enter such orders as 
necessary to clear title of the assigned deed of trust that currently 
encumbers the bowling alley property. This is because First 
Bank’s lien against the bowling alley property is extinguished 
without an existing obligation secured by the assigned [Bowling 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 10 
Alley DOT]. See 18 Stoebuck & Weaver, supra, § 17.1, at 253 
(explaining that a security cannot exist without an obligation). 
If the Montana court declines to render a decision on the identified 
issue of Montana law despite (in our opinion) the parties having a 
justiciable controversy, the trial court is directed to determine these 
questions of Montana law.  
Id. at 694 (emphasis added).  But First Bank and Banana Belt did not follow these instructions, 
and did not file suit to determine: (a) if a deficiency was allowed under Montana law, and (b) if 
so, in what amount.  Instead and inexplicably, First Bank voluntarily dismissed its First 
Washington Lawsuit with prejudice, and the stipulated order on May 20, 2016, provided: 
all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Banana Belt, all cross-
claims of Defendant Banana Belt against Defendants Donald C. 
Tuschoff and Jane Doe Tuschoff, all counterclaims of Defendant 
Banana Belt against Plaintiff, and any claim that Plaintiff has made 
seeking authority to foreclose on the [bowling alley] property 
situated in Asotin County, Washington, which is the subject of this 
lawsuit (the "subject property"), are dismissed with prejudice and 
without attorneys' fees or costs. Any remedy seeking to void 
Defendant Banana Belt's interest in, or seeking to restore 
Plaintiff’s right to the subject property is also abandoned and 
dismissed with prejudice.35 
Around this same time, on April 25, 2016, new counsel for First Bank wrote to the bank’s 
former counsel and its former trustee KD Feeback, presenting a claim for malpractice on the 
basis of a full credit bid having been made.36  Apparently not satisfied with its malpractice claim, 
First Bank shortly thereafter filed the Second Washington Lawsuit against First American and 
filed the Complaint in the present action against Land Title. 
                                                 
35 R. 105 to 110 (emphasis added). 
36 R. 112. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether a deficiency judgment of any sort is allowed in a non-judicial foreclosure 
case under the express language of Montana statutory law, and if a deficiency is 
allowed, does the full faith and credit rule apply in this instance? 
B. Whether alternative grounds as follows, which were raised on summary judgment 
but not reached by the District Court, nevertheless provide an independent basis 
to uphold all or portions of the District Court’s decision, including : (i) election of 
remedies by First Bank or judicial estoppel bars First Bank from pursuing this 
action; (ii) prohibited economic damages are sought; (iii) Washington law 
provides a statute of limitations barring a negligence claim; (iv) no duty in 
negligence was owed to First Bank by Land Title; (iv) no third party beneficiary 
claim will lie; and (vi) specific performance is a remedy, not its own cause of 
action? 
C. Whether Land Title should receive an award of attorney’s fees and costs on 
appeal?37 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)-(e) and I.C. §§ 12-121 and 12-120(3), Land Title requests 
appellate attorney fees and costs and will present its argument on the issue of the same supported 
by citation to authorities, statutes, and the record in Section IV herein.  
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review.  
 “This Court reviews a ruling on summary judgment under the same standard as the trial 
court.”  Hayes v. City of Plummer, 159 Idaho 168, 357 P.3d 1276, 1278 (2015).  “Summary 
judgment is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
                                                 
37 By raising the issue of attorney fees, Land Title simply seeks said fees if this Court finds it 
appropriate under law to award them; neither the fact of seeking such fees or any other action of 
Land Title should be construed as an admission on the part of Land Title that such fees are 
appropriate. 
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’”  Id. (quoting I.R.C.P. 56(c)). “Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the plaintiff fails to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of 
material fact as to causation and damages.”  J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 
146 Idaho 311, 317, 193 P.3d 858, 864 (2008) (quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 396, 
64 P.3d 317, 322 (2003)). With respect to a case involving application of the law of another 
state, this Court has noted: 
Idaho appellate standards of review apply even when a contract's choice of law 
provision requires the application of the law of another state.  In reviewing a grant 
of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the district 
court's standard in ruling upon a motion. 
 
Harmon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 162 Idaho 94, 98, 394 P.3d 796, 800 (2017)(citations 
omitted).  Further, a district court decision may be upheld on “alternate grounds from those 
stated in the finding of fact and conclusions of law on appeal.”  Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 
453, 65 P.3d 192, 194 (2003)(citations omitted). 
B. No Dispute Exists that Montana Law Applies to the Hotel Lincoln Foreclosure Sale, 
But Significant Dispute Exists Over the Import and Meaning of that Law 
There is no dispute between the parties here that the effect of a full credit bid made at the 
Hotel Lincoln Foreclosure Sale is determined under Montana law, assuming that a deficiency 
judgment is allowed under Montana law.  The lower court ruled that the Full Credit Bid Rule 
prevented further recovery by First Bank.  Implicit in that District Court decision was a ruling 
that a deficiency judgment is possible for a commercial type non-judicial foreclosure under 
Montana law.  If no such deficiency were possible, that would be grounds to reach the decision 
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reached by the District Court without application to the Full Credit Bid Rule.  Additionally, a 
number of alternative grounds under Idaho law and even the law of the state of Washington were 
raised by Land Title during this case but not reached by the District Court.38  Those additional 
grounds would provide a basis to independently uphold a portion of or the entirety of the District 
Court decision granting summary judgment in favor of Land Title.  Each of these arguments will 
be addressed by Land Title in turn. 
1. The Plain Language of the Montana Anti-Deficiency Statute Justifies 
Upholding the District Court’s Decision 
There are two reasons why the Hotel Lincoln Foreclosure Sale bars the entirety of the 
present action.  Either (a) the unavailability of a deficiency action under Montana law, or (b) if a 
deficiency action is available under Montana law, the Full Credit Bid Rule, each here 
independently prevent there from being any amount due to First Bank.  In other words, these 
each create an independent complete defense meriting summary judgment in favor of Land Title.  
Here, the District Court implicitly found that there was an exception to the Montana anti-
deficiency statute in order to even address the application of the Full Credit Bid Rule.  Such 
finding was in error. 
As noted by the Washington Court of Appeals, Montana statutory law is clear that when 
there is a non-judicial foreclosure by trustee’s sale—as was the case here—no deficiency 
judgment is allowed against any person obligated on the note, bond, or other obligation. The 
applicable statute provides: 
                                                 
38 See R. at 471-475 regarding Land Title’s position on applicable Choice of Law, which is 
incorporated herein by reference and restated as if set forth in full. 
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When a trust indenture executed in conformity with this part is foreclosed by 
advertisement and sale, other or further action, suit, or proceedings may not be 
taken or judgment entered for any deficiency against the grantor or the grantor's 
surety, guarantor, or successor in interest, if any, on the note, bond, or other 
obligation secured by the trust indenture or against any other person obligated 
on the note, bond, or other obligation. 
MCA 71-1-317 (emphasis added). It was in fact this language as interpreted in First State Bank 
of Forsyth v. Chunkapura, 734 P.2d 1203 (Mont. 1987), that prompted the Washington Court of 
Appeals in the First Bank of Lincoln v. Tuschoff case to become concerned that the Chunkapura 
decision may have created ambiguity as to whether a deficiency is allowed in non-judicial 
foreclosures of commercial deeds of trust.  Specifically, the Washington Court of Appeals stated:  
The Chunkapura court later restricted its opinion in an order on rehearing. It is 
this restriction that creates the ambiguity for this court. On rehearing, the 
Chunkapura court restricted the nondeficiency rule to future foreclosures of 
residential property.  Id. at 67, 734 P.2d 1203. The restrictive language seemingly 
allows a deficiency judgment following any foreclosure of nonresidential 
property, i.e., commercial property. However, it can be argued that the rehearing 
order was intended only to permit a deficiency judgment following a judicial 
foreclosure of commercial property, and did not alter the earlier unanimous 
statements from the majority and dissent which agreed that under the plain 
language of MCA § 71–1–317 there cannot be a deficiency judgment following a 
nonjudicial (advertisement and sale) foreclosure.  See Trs. of the Wash.–Idaho–
Mont. Carpenters–Emp'rs Ret. Trust Fund v. Galleria P'ship, 239 Mont. 250, 
257–58, 780 P.2d 608 (1989) (“When a lender holding a trust indenture as 
security chooses to foreclose under the mortgage laws, Chunkapura as modified 
holds that except for occupied single family residential property, lenders can 
obtain a deficiency judgment even on trust indentures.”). 
 
First Bank of Lincoln, 375 P.3d at 694 (emphasis in bold added, emphasis in italics in original 
quote). Again, as noted above, Banana Belt did not follow the Washington Court of Appeal’s 
instruction to file in a Montana court “to determine whether First Bank has a right to a deficiency 
judgment on its promissory note with Tuschoff following its election to foreclose against the 
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Hotel Lincoln by advertisement and sale, and if so, the amount of the deficiency judgment.”  Id.  
Instead, First Bank stipulated with Banana Belt to a resolution of that case that involved First 
Bank voluntarily giving up the relief it had just obtained, vindication of its right to maintain a 
deed of trust on the bowling alley property. 
From the Idaho Supreme Court’s perspective, looking at the murky state of Montana 
caselaw, plain meaning statutory construction should carry the day.  The plain language of MCA 
Section 71-1-317 shines through as clearly stating that there is no deficiency judgment allowed, 
i.e., when a trust indenture is foreclosed by advertisement and sale—a trustee’s non-judicial 
foreclosure sale—no further action may be taken to recover on the debt.  The facts of the 
Chunkapura case involved a residential, judicial foreclosure of a trust deed and that court was 
only in dicta discussing a trustee’s non-judicial foreclosure of a trust deed on commercial real 
property.  The Court’s holding that the anti-deficiency protections applied to a judicial 
foreclosure of a residential trust deed and its later reservation of that holding to residential sales 
should be read in this light.  Neither the Chunkapura cases, nor any Montana case since then, has 
done violence to the plain meaning of Section 71-1-317 and its prohibition against deficiencies in 
all situations where a trust deed is foreclosed by non judicial “advertisement and sale.” In the 
absence of a clear holding in Montana case law otherwise, this Court should apply the plain 
meaning of the Montana Anti-Deficiency statute, i.e., that after a non-judicial sale of the type 
that occurred here, “that other or further action, suit, or proceedings may not be taken.”  
Therefore First Bank’s debt is extinguished and no claim whatsoever lies against Land Title.  Cf. 
First Bank of Lincoln v. Tuschoff, 193 Wash. App. 413, 426, 375 P.3d 687, 694 (2016) 
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(“. . . First Bank's lien against the bowling alley property is extinguished without an existing 
obligation secured by the assigned Bowling Alley DOT.”)(unpublished portion of decision). 
2. The Full Credit Bid Rule Is Dispositive and Justifies Upholding the District 
Court’s Decision 
(a) The Full Credit Bid Rule Exists Not Only to Avoid a Double 
Recovery and Associated Windfall to a Creditor, But to Ensure 
the Integrity of Bidding at Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sales 
In the event this Court determines that a deficiency is possible under Montana law, 
nevertheless, the effect of the foreclosure sale and the full credit bid was to extinguish any debt 
that could form the basis of such a claimed recovery.  As noted in Corpus Juris Secundum,  
When a lender bids at a foreclosure sale, it is not required to pay cash, but rather 
is permitted to make a credit bid because any cash tendered would be returned to 
it.  If this credit bid is equal to the unpaid principal and interest on the mortgage 
plus the costs of foreclosure, this is known as a “full credit bid.” 
59 A.C.J.S. Mortgages § 1138.39  In this case, the amount so bid and required to be credited as 
cash payment on the debt was a full credit bid, the entire amount of the debt then due.  This 
brings into effect what is known as the “Full Credit Bid Rule,” one justification for which is 
avoiding a double recovery to the lender.  In Najah v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 230 Cal. App. 4th 125, 
133, 178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 400, 407 (2014), the Court stated: 
Under the Full Credit Bid Rule, when the lienholder obtains a property at a 
foreclosure sale by making a full credit bid—bidding an amount equal to the 
unpaid debt, including interest, costs, fees, and other expenses of foreclosure—“it 
                                                 
39 See also U.S. National Bank Assn. v. American General Home Equity, Inc., 387 S.W.3d 345 
(Ct. App. Ken. 2012) (“Although there is no statutory or case law on the subject, the parties 
agree that credit bids are commonly used at judicial sales.  The purpose of allowing a credit bid 
is to avoid the inefficiency of requiring a bidder to tender cash where a portion of it would be 
immediately returned.”). 
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is precluded for purposes of collecting its debt from later claiming that the 
property was actually worth less than the bid. [Citations.]”  (Alliance Mortgage, 
supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1238, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601.) After acquiring 
the property in this manner, the beneficiary is generally unable to pursue “‘any 
other remedy regardless of the actual value of the property on the date of the 
sale.’”12  (Passanisi v. Merit–McBride Realtors, Inc. (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1496, 
1503, 236 Cal.Rptr. 59, italics omitted, quoting 1 Miller & Starr, Current Law of 
Cal. Real Estate (rev. ed., 1986 supp.) Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, § 3:126, p. 
354.) “This is because the lender's only interest in the property is the repayment of 
the debt. [Citation.] The lender's interest having been satisfied, any other payment 
would result in a double recovery.” (Track Mortgage Group, Inc. v. Crusader Ins. 
Co. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 857, 864, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 228 (Track Mortgage ); 
accord, Cornelison v. Kornbluth, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 606, 125 Cal.Rptr. 557, 
542 P.2d 981 [full credit bid at foreclosure sale “establishes the value of the [liened 
property] as being equal to the outstanding indebtedness” and “the nonexistence of 
any impairment of the security”]; Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Tutungi (1998) 
66 Cal.App.4th 727, 731, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 [“Under the Full Credit Bid Rule, a 
foreclosing lender that has purchased the real property security for such a bid is 
precluded from pursuing further claims to recoup its debt, because the bid has 
established that the foreclosed security is equal in value to the debt, which 
therefore has been satisfied.”].) “Thus, the lender is not entitled to insurance 
proceeds payable for prepurchase damage to the property, prepurchase net rent 
proceeds, or damages for waste, because the lender's only interest in the property, 
the repayment of its debt, has been satisfied, and any further payment would 
result in a double recovery.” (Alliance Mortgage, supra, at p. 1238, 44 
Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 900 P.2d 601.) 
Id. at 133-34, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08 (emphasis added).  The Najah court also noted that an 
additional policy justification was to protect the integrity of the public non-judicial foreclosure 
auction and encourage proper and competitive bidding by the lender in its credit bid: 
Apart from preventing double recovery, the Full Credit Bid Rule serves to protect 
the integrity of the foreclosure auction. In discussing the Full Credit Bid Rule, our 
Supreme Court has said, “‘[t]he purpose of the trustee's sale is to resolve the 
question of value ... through competitive bidding....’” (Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 607, 125 Cal.Rptr. 557, 542 P.2d 981, quoting Hetland, Cal. 
Real Estate Secured Transactions (Cont. Ed. Bar 1970) p. 255.) In order to ensure 
that a “fair price” is obtained for the foreclosure property, it must be “sold at 
public sale to the highest bidder, and at least 20 days' notice of the sale must be 
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given.” (Smith v. Allen (1968) 68 Cal.2d 93, 96, 65 Cal.Rptr. 153, 436 P.2d 65.) 
These procedures guarantee that foreclosure auctions are conducted in a “fair and 
open manner,” with the property going to the party placing the highest value on it, 
and that any interested member of the public has the opportunity “to participate in 
setting the price for the property.”  (Dreyfuss v. Union Bank of California (2000) 
24 Cal.4th 400, 411, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 29, 11 P.3d 383.)  A lender who intends to 
later claim that the value of the property was impaired due to waste, fraud or 
insured damage, but nonetheless makes a full credit bid, interferes with that 
process by impeding bids from third parties willing to pay some amount between 
the value the lender places on the property and the amount of its full credit bid. 
(See 4 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2000) § 10:265, p. 10–1067 [“The 
beneficiary controls the sale, and the full-credit bid by the beneficiary discourages 
other bidders who may be willing to pay a substantial sum, although less than the 
beneficiary's bid.”].)  The Full Credit Bid Rule may act to limit recovery by a 
foreclosing lender who hopes to pursue a legal claim for injury to the property.  
But “[i]f there were no repercussions for making a full credit bid, lenders could 
manipulate the sale and discourage prospective purchasers who might have 
been willing to pay just under the value of the lien.”  (Michelson v. Camp (1999) 
72 Cal.App.4th 955, 964, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 539.) 
Id. at 133-34, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 407-08 (emphasis added).  Put differently, “[t]o allow the 
[lender], after effectively cutting off or discouraging lower bidders, to take the property—and 
then establish that it was worth less than the bid—encourages fraud, creates uncertainty as to the 
[borrower]'s rights, and most unfairly deprives the sale of whatever leaven comes from other 
bidders.”  Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Allstate Ins. Co., 28 N.Y.2d 332, 337, 321 N.Y.S.2d 
862, 270 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1971).40  It only makes sense that there are “repercussions for making 
                                                 
40 See also In Re: Charles D. Stapp of Nevada, Inc., 641 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1981)(applying 
Nevada law)(Holding that an assignment of rents to creditor was no longer enforceable after a 
“full credit bid” because “there was no deficiency after the sale. In other words, the bankrupt's 
obligations to Equitable and Kelban had been fully paid. Accordingly, appellants have no claim 
to the rents.”); In re Oklahoma P.A.C. First Ltd. Partnership, 168 B.R. 212 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
1993), aff'd, 174 B.R. 350 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) (lenders who made full credit bid had no claim 
to rents sequestered in bankruptcy; their lien on this additional collateral was only operative if an 
indebtedness was extant); Najah v. Scottsdale Insurance Company, 230 Cal.App.4th 125 (2nd 
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a full credit bid,” Michelson, 72 Cal.App.4th at 964, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d at 545, including ending a 
lender’s rights as against parties outside the lender-borrower relationship, such as insurers, 
appraisers, escrow agents and brokers, except in very limited circumstances. See e.g., Smith v. 
Gen. Mortg. Corp., 402 Mich. 125, 128, 261 N.W.2d 710, 712 (1978)(full credit bid terminates 
the borrower's rights to insurance proceeds for damage to the property); Whitestone, 28 N.Y.2d 
at 336–37, 321 N.Y.S.2d 862, 270 N.E.2d at 696–97 (same); Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal.3d 
590, 606, 125 Cal.Rptr. 557, 542 P.2d 981, 992–93 (1975)(no action for waste would lie after 
full credit bid).  
In the unpublished portion41 of First Bank of Lincoln v. Tuschoff and Banana Belt 
Gaming, LLC, 375 P.3d 687 (Wash, App. 2016), the Washington Appeals Court alluded to the 
common sense, common thread that demands dismissal of First Bank’s complaint if the Montana 
anti-deficiency statute applies: “First Bank’s lien against the bowling alley property is 
extinguished without an existing obligation secured by the assigned [Bowling Alley DOT].” Id. 
at 694.  This principle holds true for the Full Credit Bid Rule as well.  If the underlying 
obligation is paid, any over-secured position becomes moot—no creditor should be paid twice. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dist., Div. 4., Cal. 2014)(“Because a mortgage debt is extinguished by a full credit bid, it is well 
established that a mortgagee who purchases an encumbered property at a foreclosure sale by 
making a full credit bid is not entitled to insurance proceeds payable for preforeclosure damage 
to the property.”). 
41 As to First Bank, a party to that Washington proceeding and the dismissal with prejudice of the 
same immediately after entry of this decision, this unpublished decision should be binding under 
claim or issue preclusion principles of res judicata.  Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 
70, 878 P.2d 762, 769 (1994)(res judicata). 
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(b) Montana has Applied The Full Credit Bid Rule Since Early 
Times 
The idea of a credit bid being equivalent to a cash payment of that much of the debt not 
only as between the debtor and the creditor, but as between the creditor and third parties, has 
been recognized in the state of Montana since earliest times.  In the case of Jurgens v. Hauser, 
47 P. 809 (Mont. 1897), the court held that a sheriff when accepting a judgment creditor’s credit 
bid at a judicial foreclosure sale had indeed received payable money on process under the 
relevant statute, thus earning his commission under the applicable statute: 
The practice of crediting the amount of the mortgagee’s bid, if the mortgagee 
purchased, upon the sheriff’s return of the execution, is well spoken of by 
Gilfillan C.J. in Sharvey v. Iron Mountain Co. (Minn.) 58 N.W. 864:  “When an 
execution creditor bids upon property levied on, he bids as anyone else does, 
except that, if it be struck off to him, to avoid circuity of action, and as a matter of 
convenience, he is not required to go through the ceremony of paying the money 
to the sheriff, and receiving it back from him.  But he is presumed, as anyone else 
would be, to bid the property off at what he deems to be its value; there is 
secured to him, by means of execution and sale, the amount of the bid, less the 
fees and expenses, by acquiring title to the property if the sale become absolute, 
and by actual receipt of money if there be redemption.  Whatever he acquires by 
the execution of the sale is deemed to be a collection, not only as between him 
and the judgment debtor, but as between him and the sheriff.   
Id. at 810 (emphasis added). The same principle was applied more recently by the Montana 
Supreme Court in the case of Rocky Mountain Bank v. Stuart, 928 P.2d 243 (Mont. 1996).  
There, in the context of a non-judicial foreclosure sale, the court considered whether the bank 
could properly pay with a “credit bid” or whether the sale was improperly conducted because the 
bank did not “pay the price bid in cash” as required by the applicable statute. Id. at 80 (citing 
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF - 21 
MCA § 71-1-315(4)).  After noting that courts generally define “cash as the antonym of credit,” 
the court went on to say that: 
[The bank] bid $69,900 on the trust property at the foreclosure sale and after 
acceptance of its bid by the trustee, credited the bid amount to the outstanding 
indebtedness owed to it by [the debtor].  Application of the bid amount to 
Stuart’s outstanding indebtedness is the equivalent of a money payment of the 
bid amount because it reduced the amount of Stuart’s outstanding indebtedness 
to the bank in precisely the same way that a payment in cash to the trustee—
followed by the trustee turning over that amount to the bank for application to 
Stuart’s indebtedness—would reduce the amount Stuart owed to the bank.  We 
conclude, therefore, that an accepted “credit bid” by the trust indenture 
beneficiary at a non-judicial STFA foreclosure sale, defined by the prompt 
application of the bid amount to the trust indenture of grantor’s 
outstanding debt, constitutes payment by the purchaser of the price bid in 
cash as required by § 71-1-315(4), MCA. 
Id. at 81 (emphasis added).  Thus, it is clear that the credit bid is the equivalent of bidding that 
much cash and also under Montana law that by making such a credit bid, the lender is obligated 
to apply the amount so bid as payment against the indebtedness.  First Bank attempts to 
distinguish Rocky Mountain Bank on the basis that that case allegedly did not involve an over 
secured lender.  But that offered distinction does not change the import of the Rocky Mountain 
Bank case.  A lender could have pledged to it all of the security in the free world for a debt, but 
once the debt is paid, whether paid in official tender, or in its equivalent in gold bullion, bit coin, 
or in the form of a credit bid, and the lender has accepted that payment in full, there is no more 
debt.  The rest of the security is instantly freed and released from the pledge. 
The Notice of Trustee’s Sale in this case provided that “the bid price must be paid in cash 
and conveyance will be made by a Trustee’s Deed . . . .” and that Trustee’s Deed provided that 
First Bank “has paid the purchase price due on the sale by credit bid.”  Given that First Bank 
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made a full credit bid, the Full Credit Bid Rule operates to extinguish any further claims it may 
have, as First Bank has told that to the world and agreed to receive the Hotel Lincoln property 
for its entire debt.  In contrast to the trustee attorney Feeback who potentially negligently advised 
a full credit bid (and against whom a claim may lie under the exception to the Full Credit Bid 
Rule, see infra IV.A.ii.(d)), Land Title had nothing to do with the value that First Bank 
voluntarily chose to put on the value of the Hotel Lincoln in the Hotel Lincoln Foreclosure Sale.  
Land Title’s alleged conduct only has to do with the Washington state Bowling Alley DOT.  
Under the Full Credit Bid Rule as it should be applied under Montana law, First Bank does not 
get to go back and claim ignorance or that it bid too much. What is done is done and that sale is 
final.  The debt is extinguished and to allow First Bank to recover again would be to allow it a 
double recovery and threaten the integrity of the trustee sale process. 
(c) The Galleria Partnership and AVCO Cases are 
Distinguishable and Inapposite, Primarily Because Neither 
Involve Protecting a Creditor from the Consequences of a Full 
Credit Bid. 
First Bank attempts to argue based on several cases that a lender, in this case a very 
sophisticated lender, should be protected from the repercussions of its making a full credit bid.  
None of the three cases cited by First Bank for this proposition so hold.  Nor do any of these 
three cases give good grounds to overturn the universal application of the Full Credit Bid Rule 
that other courts have seen fit to make on the basis of (a) avoiding a double recovery to a lender; 
and (b) avoiding unscrupulous underbidding by lenders at foreclosure sales to drive the price 
down. 
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The case of Trustees of Washington-Idaho-Montana-Carpenters-Employers Ret. Tr. Fund 
v. Galleria P'ship, 780 P.2d 608, 609 (Mont. 1989)(“Galleria I”), is cited for the notion that a 
gross underbid by a lender should not be allowed to stand where it would have the effect of 
crediting for example only $1,000 against a million dollar property. After noting that Montana’s 
statutes have no direct provisions to determine fair market value at the time of the sale, the Court 
noted that most of Montana’s surrounding states have “statutes show[ing] that predominantly, a 
deficiency judgment is limited to the difference between the fair market value of the secured 
property at the time of the foreclosure sale, regardless of a lesser amount realized at the sale, 
and the outstanding debt for which the property was secured.”  Id. at 610 (citing First State Bank 
of Forsyth v. Chunkapura, 734 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Mont. 1987)).  Notably, the law of Idaho to 
which Galleria I was likely referring is Idaho Code Section 45-1512, which says almost exactly 
these words in setting the deficiency judgment.  The Galleria I court cited with approval that the 
purpose of these types of statutes is “to prevent the injustice that occurs when a debtor's property 
is sold on foreclosure sale for a price significantly less than its fair market value.”   
But it pushes this reasoning beyond the breaking point to say that a sophisticated lender 
too, such as a bank, deserves protection from paying too much in the form of a credit bid for the 
property.  If a lender does not have encouragement to bid at the auction what is in fact the fair 
market value of the property, the lender has incentive to bid up the price of the property, obtain 
the property to resell it at its leisure, all to the detriment of other bidders who would pay cash, 
and then claim that it made a mistake.  Neither Galleria I nor any of the statutes or case law that 
the court relied upon held that a lender—in contrast to a borrower—is worthy of protection from 
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a high credit bid in the same way that a borrower should be protected from a low one; the 
protection is for the borrower from a low credit bid, not for a lender from making a high credit 
bid.  Accord Bank of Baker v. Mikelson Land Co., 979 P.2d 180, 182 (Mont. 1999)(in judicial 
foreclosure action, seemingly low cash bid upheld as intrinsic value of property in part due to 
fact it was from a third party, arms-length buyer and not a credit bid by bank). 
AVCO Fin. Servs. of Billings One, Inc. v. Christiaens, 201 Mont. 117, 118, 652 P.2d 220, 
221 (1982), and its supposed recognition of a creditor’s “ability to be paid efficiently” adds 
nothing here.  In AVCO, the lender had loaned money and received security on various 
household goods and two older automobiles.  It had also received a second position deed of trust 
on certain real property owned by the debtor, with a company called Nationwide in first position 
for its loan and deed of trust.  Nationwide had a non-judicial foreclosure sale on its first position 
deed of trust.  AVCO, evidently to protect its interest, paid cash in the amount owed on the first 
position at that sale and received a trustee’s deed.  The efficient choice of foreclosure language 
in that case is in the context of discussing whether AVCO under its personal property security 
documentation could elect to pursue a judgment lien prior to going after personal property.  That 
ruling does not speak to the Montana anti-deficiency statute or calculation of the fair market 
value on AVCO’s second position.  In fact, the closest the court comes to the deficiency issues is 
simply to say that the Montana anti-deficiency statute only applied to the sale by the first 
position Nationwide and barred Nationwide from seeking a deficiency, but that as the purchaser 
for cash receiving a trustee’s deed, of course, AVCO was not so bound on other debt it was 
owed.  But again, this had no bearing whatsoever on cases that hold the Full Credit Bid Rule 
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means that a lender should not be protected from the consequences of it imprudently making a 
full credit bid. 
(d) No General Exception for Causes of Action again Non-
Borrower Third Parties Is Recognized in Montana or As a 
Majority Rule, and If An Exception Were to Be Recognized 
The Scope Should be Limited to Cases Involving Fraud 
Affecting the Making of a Full Credit Bid as Montana’s 
Statutory Scheme Makes The Amount Bid Binding as to Third 
Parties.  
First Bank argues for the first time on appeal that the Full Credit Bid Rule has an 
exception for all causes of action against non-borrower third parties such as First Bank.  As an 
initial point, the fact that no such law exists in the state of Montana is grounds for this Court not 
to even delve into that claimed exception.  Indeed, the Jurgens v. Hauser, 47 P. 809 (Mont. 
1897), case, supra, stands as an example in Montana for the contrary proposition, where a credit 
bid at sale was binding for determining the commission owed a third party, i.e., the Sheriff.  Id.   
Second, as was openly pointed out by Land Title in the proceeding below without dispute 
at that point by First Bank, the one well-recognized limited exception where an action against a 
third party will still lie in the face of the Full Credit Bid Rule is where an erroneous full credit 
bid was proximately caused by the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentations or misconduct.  As 
stated in All. Mortg. Co. v. Rothwell, 10 Cal. 4th 1226, 1247, 900 P.2d 601, 614 (1995): 
As with any purchaser at a foreclosure sale, by making a successful full credit bid 
or bid in any amount, the lender is making a generally irrevocable offer to 
purchase the property for that amount. The lender, perhaps more than a third party 
purchaser with fewer resources with which to gain insight into the property's 
value, generally bears the burden and risk of making an informed bid. It does not 
follow, however, that being intentionally and materially misled by its own 
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fiduciaries or agents as to the value of the property prior to even making the loan 
is within the realm of that risk. 
Id. at 1246, 900 P.2d at 613 (citations omitted).  There is no dispute in the present case that Land 
Title had absolutely nothing to do with the Hotel Lincoln Foreclosure Sale or the decision of 
First Bank to make a full credit bid at that sale, so this fraud exception does not apply here.  
Again, as noted elsewhere in this brief, First Bank’s trustee/attorney may bear responsibility in 
this respect and this was the subject of a malpractice insurance claim by First Bank on April 25, 
2016. 42 
This well-recognized limited exception—i.e., that fraud or wrongful conduct affecting the 
credit bid is the only exception—finds application in the holdings of a number of cases from 
throughout the country that apply the Full Credit Bid Rule with full force to bar claims against 
third parties.  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 2015 WL 5276346, at *6 (N.D. 
Ill. Sept. 9, 2015) (holding that, under Illinois law, “[u]nder the Full Credit Bid Rule, where the 
property is obtained for a full credit bid, the underlying debt is deemed satisfied and the 
foreclosing lender is not entitled to either a deficiency judgment or related damages.  Where the 
property is obtained by the foreclosing lender for a partial credit bid (i.e., the credit bid is for an 
amount less than the full value of the loan) and there is no fraud or irregularity in the foreclosure 
proceeding, the amount of the lender's successful credit bid “is deemed to be the conclusive 
measure of the property's value for purposes of determining the value of any deficiency.  In that 
circumstance, the lender is limited to recovering the sum of the deficiency judgment and 
                                                 
42R. 112. 
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collaterally estopped from claiming greater losses.”); Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long 
Beach v. Cohen, 2016 WL 5787259, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (holding that “the Full Credit Bid 
Rule is not limited to borrowers” and that “in the absence of fraud, the Full Credit Bid Rule 
applies and prevents post sale remedies against not only the borrower but third parties”). 
Underpinning the policy behind this limited exception to the Full Credit Bid Rule is the notion 
that the cause of action alleged against a third party has to cause damages independent of value 
of the property received in the foreclosure sale and valued by virtue of the full credit bid before 
the Full Credit Bid Rule is disregarded.  See e.g., ING Bank, FSB v. Mata, 2009 WL 4672797, at 
*4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 3, 2009) (“If a credit-bid fully satisfies the obligation, then the creditor cannot 
sue third parties for damages based on any alleged deficiency in the payment of that obligation” 
and holding that summary judgment in favor of party who originated loan was appropriate on 
“negligence, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty claims because those claims were 
‘predicated entirely upon [the lender's] interest under the deed of trust,’ which ‘were fully and 
expressly satisfied by the full-credit bid.’”); First Dakota Nat. Bank v. Graham, 864 N.W.2d 292 
(S.D. 2015) (holding that guarantor’s obligations were “unambiguously connected to the 
existence of the indebtedness of [Borrower] to [Lender],” and therefore, the Lender’s full credit 
bid extinguished the guaranties.).  
In the Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. case for example, the FDIC 
alleged that the defendants Chicago Title Insurance Co. and Chicago Trust and Title Insurance 
Co. (the “Chicago Entities”) acted negligently and breached contractual duties in their role as 
closing agents.  The court reasoned that:  
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[A]pplying the credit bid rule to limit recovery against third parties makes 
sound policy sense: absent proof of fraud or negligence that caused the lender to 
submit a credit bid that was too high, ‘[t]o allow the [lender], after effectively 
cutting off or discouraging lower bidders, to take the property—and then establish 
that it was worth less than the bid—encourages fraud, creates uncertainty as to the 
[borrower]’s rights, and most unfairly deprives the sale of whatever leaven comes 
from other bidders.’ 
Id. (emphasis added).43 The court also noted that the defendant could not produce any policy 
argument why application of the credit bid rule to recoveries against third parties is unfair, 
“especially given the acknowledged exception when a credit bid is the product of a defendant’s 
malfeasance.” Id. 
In the present case, the note and deed of trust on the Washington state Bowling Alley 
serves as a second form of security. First Bank cannot make a full credit bid on its first form of 
security and still collect payment from the Bowling Alley collateral.  The underlying obligation 
to First Bank is extinguished by the initial full credit bid sale of the Hotel Lincoln and the 
Washington Bowling Alley DOT is released from its pledge as a function.  It stands to reason 
that because First Bank cannot recover funds from the Bowling Alley, it cannot bring an 
intertwined suit against Land Title over this same extinguished obligation for negligently 
releasing the Bowling Alley DOT or the proceeds of the sale of the Bowling Alley. 
                                                 
43 Accord ING Bank, FSB v. Mata, 2009 WL 4672797, at *4 (D. Ariz. Dec. 3, 2009) (“If a credit-
bid fully satisfies the obligation, then the creditor cannot sue third parties for damages based on 
any alleged deficiency in the payment of that obligation. . . . As against third parties, a full-credit 
bid would prevent a lender from asserting any damages based on the loan because the difference 
between the amount owed on the debt and the amount bid (and thus the price to which the lender 
voluntarily agreed) would be zero. Plaintiff chose its price, and it would be unjust to allow it to 
seek to recover the loan deficiency from a third party after already extinguishing the entire debt 
at the deed of trust sale.”). 
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Equity Income Partners, LP v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 387 P.3d 1263, 1264 (Ariz. 2017), 
is another example of a court finding the line should be drawn as to third parties on whether the 
third parties were “persons who were either indirectly or contingently liable under the loan or 
whose actions directly contributed to the lender’s loss,” in which case the Full Credit Bid Rule 
would apply.  Equity Income Partners, LP involved a claim for recovery under a title insurance 
policy.  At issue was whether the lender’s full credit bid constituted “actual payments” within the 
terms of the title insurance policy, thereby extinguishing Chicago Title’s liability under the 
policy. The Arizona Supreme Court found that the full credit bid did not act as “actual payment” 
for purposes of reducing Chicago Title’s liability to the lender.  The court explained that 
Arizona’s statutory scheme protects “the borrower and any other person directly, indirectly, or 
contingently liable under the loan such as partners and guarantors, from deficiency judgments.”  
Id.  The court distinguished other Arizona cases which found a full credit bid extinguished the 
liability of third parties. The court reasoned that those cases “all deal with claims against 
persons who were either indirectly or contingently liable under the loan or whose actions 
directly contributed to the lender’s loss.” Id. (emphasis added).  The court reasoned that in this 
case, Chicago Trust was not indirectly or contingently liable under the loan, nor were its actions 
in any way responsible for the defect in title that reduced the parcel’s value and ultimately 
caused the borrowers to default, and therefore, the anti-deficiency rule did not apply.  
Appellant’s reliance on Bank of America, NA v. First American Title Ins. Co., 878 
N.W.2d 816 (Mich. 2016), is misplaced. Bank of America provides a limited exception to the 
Full Credit Bid Rule where the creditor seeks recovery arising from a separate contractual 
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obligation against “any loss” and “actual loss.”  In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court 
considered whether a mortgagee, Bank of America, who acquired a property at the foreclosure 
sale through credit-bidding the full value of its debt could pursue claims against third parties for 
a breach of contract. As to the original loans which later were the subject of the foreclosure, 
Bank of America had sent closing instructions to two closing agents on the loans, defendants 
Westminster Abstract Company (“Westminster”) and Patriot Title Agency (“Patriot”). The 
closing instructions required that a closing protection letter (“CPL”), apparently a type of 
indemnity, be issued in connection with each closing. Defendant First American Title Insurance 
Co. (“First American”) was the title insurance company for all four sales and agreed to issue 
CPLs for all four closings. The closing instructions to Westminster and Patriot read that “as a 
closing agent you are financially liable for any loss resulting from your failure to follow these 
instructions.” Id. at 84, 878 N.W.2d 816.  Similarly, under the CPLs, First American agreed to 
reimburse Bank of America for its “actual losses” incurred in connection with the closing if the 
losses arose out of, among other things, the fraud or dishonesty of the closing agents.  At the 
time it made the loans, Bank of America did not know that the values of the properties had been 
inflated by fraudulent appraisals and “straw buyers” who were paid for their participation. 
Shortly after closing, all four borrowers defaulted.  When the debtors defaulted on the loans, 
Bank of America acquired the property at the foreclosure sale by a full credit bid. “During the 
foreclosure proceedings, Bank of America discovered the underlying fraud in each of the four 
loans.”  Thereafter, Bank of America brought a breach of contract claim against Patriot and 
Westminster, alleging that they violated the specific terms of the closing instructions because of 
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their allegedly fraudulent activity.44  Bank of America also brought a claim against First 
American for recovery under the CPLs for the actual losses arising from Westminster’s and 
Patriot’s fraud and dishonesty during the closings.  Both Westminster and First American moved 
for summary judgment, and the Michigan Court of Appeals granted summary judgment, in part, 
based on the Full Credit Bid Rule. On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that (1) the 
closing instructions between Bank of America and Westminster constituted a contract, and that 
Bank of America’s damages under that contract were not barred by the Full Credit Bid Rule; and 
(2) the Full Credit Bid Rule did not bar Bank of America’s ability to recover damages from First 
American under the CPL.  The court reasoned that Bank of America’s right to recover damages 
for the alleged breaches of contract was different and independent of its right to recover a 
deficiency from the mortgagor. The court reasoned that:  
[H]olding that Bank of America’s full credit bids meant that it 
suffered no damages whatsoever and thus could not recover under 
any theory would impinge on the parties' ability to contract as they 
see fit and would nullify the protections for which Bank of 
America contracted.  Through the contracts at issue, Bank of 
America sought to protect itself from the very activity that 
allegedly occurred in this case—fraud by those individuals 
involved in closing the mortgage. Bank of America’s ability to 
recover under the contracts is not limited by its bids on the 
properties; instead, as discussed later in this opinion, the parties 
agreed that Bank of America could recover for any loss resulting 
from Westminster's failure to follow the closing instructions and its 
actual losses arising out of the fraud or dishonesty of Westminster 
in connection with the closings 
 
                                                 
44 By the time the case went to the Supreme Court, Patriot had been dismissed or otherwise 
defaulted from the action. See n. 5. 
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Id. at 98, 878 N.W.2d at 828 (emphasis in original).  The court explained that “the Full Credit 
Bid Rule is related to the anti-deficiency statute, and its purpose is merely to resolve the question 
of the value of the property for purposes of determining whether the mortgage debt was 
satisfied.” The Bank of America court found that where there is a contractual obligation and 
relationship, separate and apart from the right to recover from the mortgagee, the full-credit bid 
does not bar recovery of damages from the breach of that contractual obligation. 
Unlike the bank in Bank of America, whose right to recover from First American and 
Westminster was derived from a separate contractual agreement, here, First Bank’s alleged right 
to recover from Land Title is entirely derived from its right to recover a deficiency after its non-
judicial foreclosure sale.  The Complaint does not allege there was a contract between First Bank 
and Land Title in the nature of a contract indemnity, assuming liability for any actual loss from 
the loan First Bank made.45  Yes, First Bank did bring a third party beneficiary breach of 
contract claim based on the escrow instructions between First American and Land Title, but even 
if the escrow instructions do create a contractual obligation between First Bank and Land Title, it 
is only a contract with respect to the payoff and reconveyance of the Bowling Alley DOT.  The 
alleged “contract” does not give First Bank an independent right to recover from Land Title if the 
underlying obligation on the Bowling Alley DOT is satisfied and extinguished.  As explained by 
the Bank of America court, when a mortgagee makes a full credit bid, the mortgage debt is 
satisfied, and the mortgage is extinguished. When First Bank made the full credit bid, it would 
no longer be able to recover from Tuschoff. Here, Appellant’s full credit bid meant that the 
                                                 
45 R. 241–245. 
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“mortgage debt was satisfied” as to Tuschoff and First Bank could not pursue further remedies 
against Tuschoff, including foreclosing on the deed of trust on the bowling alley.  Because First 
Bank made a full credit bid, it no longer had any interest in the bowling alley; because the 
bowling alley was security for the First Bank loan, it was now extinguished. Accordingly, even if 
Land Title had breached the “contract” and its escrow instructions and mishandled the payoff or 
not released the deed of trust, after the Hotel Lincoln DOT sale and full credit bid, First Bank  
would not be able to foreclose on the bowling alley interest, because the Bowling Alley DOT 
was extinguished.  Unlike the contracts in Bank of America, the alleged “contract”/escrow 
agreement here does not provide Appellant a right to recover from Land Title independent of 
what it would be able to recover from Tuschoff.  Looking at it from another angle, First Bank 
claims that “due to Land Title’s negligence” First Bank was unable to take advantage of [its 
security interest, the bowling alley] that oversecured its Hotel loan.”  App. Brief at p. 19. This is 
not true. Even if First Bank had not released the deed of trust, Appellant still would not be able 
to “take advantage” of its interest in the bowling alley because doing so would require it to bring 
a deficiency against Tuschoff, which the full credit bid would bar it from doing.  Unlike the 
contracts between Bank of America and First American and Westminster, which gave Bank of 
America the independent right to recover its “actual” and “any losses,” here, First Bank’s claim 
for damages against Land Title is derived solely from losses between First Bank and Tuschoff.  
The alleged “contract”/escrow agreement here cannot give Appellant greater rights than it would 
have received had no alleged “breach” (i.e. dispersing the funds to Tuschoff or releasing the deed 
of trust) taken place.  
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Bank of America is further distinguishable because that court relied upon the Michigan 
deficiency statute, saying that the “Full Credit Bid Rule is related to the anti-deficiency statue.”  
Id. at 827-28 (“[W]hen enacting Michigan's anti-deficiency statute, the Legislature clearly 
limited its effect to the rights of the parties to the mortgage debt. We have recognized that the 
Legislature enacted the anti-deficiency statute in an attempt “to safeguard the rights of the 
debtor and secure to the creditor that which is his due.”  Indeed, only “the mortgagor, trustor or 
other maker of any such obligation, or any other person liable thereon” may defend against a 
mortgagee's suit to recover a deficiency by showing “that the property sold was fairly worth the 
amount of the debt secured by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was 
substantially less than its true value[.]”).46  In the present case, however, Montana’s anti-
deficiency statute states that it is for the benefit of the “grantor’s successor in interest” or “any 
other person obligated on [any] other obligation: 
When a trust indenture executed in conformity with this part is foreclosed by 
advertisement and sale, other or further action, suit, or proceedings may not be taken 
or judgment entered for any deficiency against the grantor or the grantor's surety, 
guarantor, or successor in interest, if any, on the note, bond, or other obligation 
secured by the trust indenture or against any other person obligated on the 
note, bond, or other obligation. 
 
MCA 71-1-317 (emphasis added).  Even if the Montana statute is not applied as a complete bar 
against such persons for a deficiency judgment, it still informs the scope of who or what persons 
                                                 
46  See also Fed Dep. Ins. Corp., 2015 WL 5276346, at *6 (Regarding the language of the Illinois 
credit bid statute, the court reasoned there was “no wording in the Illinois law that would limit 
the application of the Illinois credit bid rule only to recoveries against borrowers,” but 
acknowledged some other courts have found the credit bid rule does not apply to third parties 
because the statutory language of other states implies that it does not apply to third parties.). 
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should be considered “indirectly or contingently liable under the loan or whose actions directly 
contributed to the lender’s loss,” and therefore who deserve the benefit of the Full Credit Bid 
Rule.  Land Title’s actions in this case are alleged to have impacted First Bank by contributing to 
the lenders’ loss or impairment of security.  Accordingly, the Full Credit Bid Rule should apply.  
The Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell, 900 P.2d 601, 603 (Cal. 1995), and Kolodge v. Boyd, 
88 Cal. App. 4th 349, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 749 (Cal. App. 2001), cases cited by First Bank stand 
simply for the well-recognized and previously discussed fraud exception to the Full Credit Bid 
Rule, not for any general exception to the rule whenever a third party is sued.  In other words, 
these cases hold that where a lender is induced by the intentional or negligent misrepresentation 
of third parties to make loans, that lender can recover tort damages from those parties provided 
that the lender can show that the misrepresentation induced not just the loan but also the full 
credit bid.  These cases were also influenced by the statutory language of these states’ deficiency 
statutes.  In Alliance, defendant Rothwell, a real estate appraiser and broker, and other 
defendants including North American and Ticor, implemented a scheme to fraudulently induce 
Alliance to lend money for the purchase of nine residences. Defendants prepared false residential 
purchase agreements and loan applications in the names of fictitious borrowers, deliberately 
inflated fair market value property appraisals and invented comparable property values to 
support the inflated and fraudulent appraisals.  Relying on defendants' representations, and 
unaware of their fraudulent conduct, Alliance loaned the Rothwell group the funds to purchase 
the properties. The loans were secured by deeds of trust to the respective properties. Soon after, 
the fictitious borrowers defaulted. Still not aware of the true market value of the properties, 
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Alliance purchased many of the properties at non judicial foreclosure sales by bidding the full 
credit value of the outstanding indebtedness on the notes. The court held that the fraud claims 
were not barred by the Full Credit Bid Rule, reasoning that “the Full Credit Bid Rule is not 
concerned with the relationship between the lender and third parties but only the relationship 
between the lender and the borrower[.]” 
In Kolodge, a lender made a series of loans totaling $660,000 that were secured by real 
property, which was appraised by the defendant at a value of $1.8 million.  The borrower later 
defaulted and filed for bankruptcy. At the time of the bankruptcy, the property was appraised at a 
value of $985,000. The lender foreclosed on one loan for $180,000 and obtained the property at a 
trustee's sale. The trustee's deed stated that the unpaid debt on that particular loan was $180,000. 
The Kolodge court explained that “the record is unclear whether appellant introduced and relied 
on the new appraisal in the bankruptcy proceeding.”  The lender then brought an action for 
negligent misrepresentation against the appraiser that had evaluated the property in 1992. The 
trial court granted summary judgment for defendant, finding that plaintiff had made a full credit 
bid at the foreclosure sale, which barred his causes of action.  The Kolodge court  held that the 
Full Credit Bid Rule did not foreclose plaintiff's causes of action, provided he reasonably relied 
on defendant's alleged misrepresentations when he entered his bid at the foreclosure sale. 
Relying on Alliance, the Kolodge court reasoned:  
Appellant's claim, like that of the appellant in Alliance, is that 
respondent's misrepresentations “induced [him] to make loans that 
far exceeded the [security] properties' actual worth at the time the 
loans were made, and that as a result of these misrepresentations 
[he] purchased the properties. In other words, [respondent] did not 
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damage or impair [appellant's] security interest; rather [respondent] 
deceived [appellant] at the outset as to what that security was.” 
 
Id.  The court remanded the case to determine whether the Appellant reasonably relied on the 
misrepresentation of the values of the properties when he entered his full credit bit. The court 
held that if it is found that Appellant reasonably relied on the misrepresentations, the Full Credit 
Bid Rule did not bar the action for negligence.  Id.47 
 Glenham v. Palzer, 58 Wash. App. 294, 792 P.2d 551 (1990), is likewise fully 
distinguishable. That case involved an action brought against defendants who were alleged to 
have participated in a scheme to defraud investors by getting them to invest in real estate loans 
which were inadequately secured and proceeds of loans were diverted to unauthorized uses.  
Various investors sued the defendants on claims for violations of state securities and consumer 
protection acts, common-law fraud, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and civil conspiracy in 
connection with a real estate investment offering.  The lower court dismissed the claims on the 
basis that the borrowers’ obligations were all satisfied by plaintiffs making full credit bids at a 
non-judicial foreclosure sale or accepting deeds to the secured property in lieu of foreclosure.  
The court noted that the complaint alleged that the investors did not know about the fraudulent 
scheme before the foreclosure proceedings were brought.  The court held that it would not use 
                                                 
47See also Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach v. Cohen, 2016 WL 5787259, at *1 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2016) (holding that “the Full Credit Bid Rule is not limited to borrowers” and that “in 
the absence of fraud, the Full Credit Bid Rule applies and prevents post sale remedies against not 
only the borrower but third parties” and distinguishing Kolodge, saying “[c]ontrary to appellant’s 
implicit claims, Kolodge does not limit the full credit bid between a lender and borrower,” and 
that Kolodge “stand[s] for nothing more than that the Full Credit Bid Rule is inapplicable where 
the lender is fraudulently or negligently induced to make the bid.”).  
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the Full Credit Bid Rule to immunize the defendants from liability by the statutory satisfaction 
for the secured debt. The court reasoned that it found “no indication [in the Washington statute} 
of a legislative intent to allow strangers to the loan transaction to be protected by the deficiency 
statue.”  Id.   
 Unlike the plaintiffs in Kolodge and Alliance, whose damage was caused by the 
respondents’ misrepresentations that “induced [them] to make loans that far exceeded the 
[security] properties’ actual worth at the time the loans were made, and that as a result of these 
misrepresentations [they] purchased the properties,” here the undisputed facts demonstrate that 
First Bank learned of the Bowling Alley sale, and the released deed of trust before First Bank 
foreclosed on the Hotel.  First Bank made the full credit bid with full knowledge that the deed of 
trust had been released.  Under the rules of Alliance and Kolodge, the exception for negligent or 
fraudulent misrepresentation applies only if the creditor relies on the misinformation or the 
negligence.  The Glenham decision is not entirely clear as to whether the creditors relied on the 
fraud and/or negligence of the defendants in making the full credit bids. However, the court did 
note that the complaint alleged that the investors were not made aware of the fraudulent scheme 
before the foreclosure proceedings were brought, implying that the scheme must at least impact 
the credit bid. 
 Simply put, there are no facts to avoid the impact of the Full Credit Bid Rule here.  The 
cases cited by First Bank are based on statutory schemes and facts dissimilar to the instant facts. 
The main damages in the Complaint in this case describe Land Title as having caused First Bank 
harm in the form of First Bank not being able “to take advance of all of its collateral after the 
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Tuschoff default,” and measure damages by the fair market value of the Hotel Lincoln.48  This 
case is about alleged impairment to First Bank’s security interest, and the Full Credit Bid Rule 
renders moot any such alleged impairment. 
C. Alternative Grounds Exist to Independently Support the District Court’s Decision, 
Especially Election of Remedies, Judicial Estoppel or Quasi Estoppel. 
A number of independent grounds exist, each of which would potentially bar all or some 
of the claims in this case if the Montana anti-deficiency statute or the Full Credit Bid Rule does 
not apply.  The following grounds would bar some of the claims brought, and Land Title hereby 
incorporates by reference and restates as if set forth in full its arguments made on these grounds 
in its briefing below: (1) economic loss rule applies to bar negligence claim;49 (2) Washington 
state statute of limitations bars a negligence claim; 50 (3) no duty owed as per Chavez v. Barrus, 
146 Idaho 212, 192 P.3d 1036 (2008); 51 (4) no requisite intent to benefit third party beneficiary; 
and (5) specific performance is a remedy not a cause of action.52  Moreover, First Bank’s choice 
to proceed to enforce the Bowling Alley DOT and then to voluntarily give up that deed of trust 
constituted an election of remedies, or raised a judicial estoppel or quasi estoppel or prevents 
proof of any damages against Land Title.  As noted in the fact section, First Bank treated the 
Bowling Alley DOT as still effective and pursued the First Washington Lawsuit to the end of 
foreclosing against buyer Banana Belt.  Yet in 2016, shortly after First Bank fought its way to a 
                                                 
48 R. 241-42 (paras. 4.7 & 5.7), and R. 116-118. 
49 R. at 130 to 133, 484 to 489, 606-607. 
50 R. at 473-474, 483. 
51 R. at 483-484. 
52 R. at 489-490, 608. 
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victory on appeal affirming the validity of that deed of trust, First Bank stipulated to the 
dismissal of that First Washington Lawsuit and voluntarily released the deed of trust.  The 
elements of the election of remedies bar against proceeding in a second action or for a second 
remedy are as follows: 
(1) There must be in fact two or more coexisting remedies between 
which the party has the right to elect; (2) the remedies thus open to 
him must be inconsistent; and (3) he must, by actually bringing his 
action or by some other decisive act, with knowledge of the facts, 
indicate his choice between two inconsistent remedies. 
 
Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1066–67, 695 P.2d 1201, 1205–06 (1984)(quoting 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889, 899, 452 P.2d 
993, 1003 (1969) (quoting Largilliere Co., Bankers v. Kunz, 41 Idaho 767, 772, 244 P. 404, 405 
(1925))).  The doctrine is “[g]enerally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent 
remedial rights; the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to or a repudiation of the other.”  
United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., supra, 92 Idaho at 899, 452 P.2d at 1003, (quoting 
Largilliere Co., Bankers v. Kunz, 41 Idaho 767, 772, 244 P. 404, 405 (1925)). Further, 
“[i]nconsistency of remedies is defined not as an inconsistency between the remedies, but as an 
inconsistency in the facts relied upon. ‘To make actions inconsistent one action must allege what 
the other denies, or the allegation in one must necessarily repudiate or be repugnant to the 
other.’”  Wolford, 107 Idaho at 1067, 695 P.2d at 1206 (quoting Taylor v. Robertson Petroleum 
Co., 156 Kan. 822, 137 P.2d 150, 154 (Kan.1943)). 
 In the Washington action filed against Tuschoff, First Bank took the position to the effect 
that “Tuschoff et. al. had no power to reconvey any part of the [Bowling Alley] Deed of Trust 
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they assigned” and “[First Bank] seeks a declaration that its Deed of Trust remains a lien on the 
subject land.”53  But once the Washington court vindicated that position on appeal, First Bank 
voluntarily gave up its Bowling Alley DOT.  Then, in the present action against Land Title, First 
Bank now takes the position that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of Land Title’s negligent 
acts, First Bank was unable to take advantage of all of its collateral following the Tuschoff 
Default . . . ” and also that “First Bank suffered damages in the amount of the original loan to 
Tuschoff, less the fair-market value of the Hotel Lincoln.”54 By first electing to pursue the 
remedy of having its lien declared valid and enforceable, then releasing the lien itself, First Bank 
itself caused the Bowling Alley DOT to be released, and may not now assert that by virtue of 
Land Title’s inaction the lien should have been released earlier, and now attempt to recover 
damages for the alleged wrongful failure to release.  
 For these same reasons, the doctrine of judicial estoppel and quasi-estoppel also bar First 
Bank’s action.  Judicial estoppel is applied “when a litigant obtains a judgment, advantage, or 
consideration from one party, through means of sworn statements, and subsequently adopts 
inconsistent and contrary allegations or testimony to obtain a recovery or a right against another 
party, arising out of the same transaction or subject matter.”  Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 
240, 178 P.3d 597, 605 (2008) (citations omitted).  In the Washington action filed against 
Tuschoff, First Bank obtained an advantageous ruling from the Court stating that the lien it 
possessed on the bowling alley was still valid.  Instead of pursuing that case further in Montana, 
                                                 
53 R. 82-85, at paragraphs 13 and 15 (emphasis added). 
54 R. 241-242 (paras. 4.7 and 5.7), and R. 116-118. 
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First Bank then took the inconsistent position and released the lien, and made the claim in this 
action that Land Title should have released it much sooner.  According, judicial estoppel and 
quasi-estoppel may both be applied to prevent First Bank from taking a different position from 
one it already gained an advantage from.  
D. Land Title is Entitled to its Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal.  
Land Title if it prevails in this appeal is entitled to costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §§ 12-121 and 12-120(3). An “award of attorney fees under Idaho 
Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the 
court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.”  Teurlings v. Larson, 156 Idaho 65, 
75, 320 P.3d 1224, 1234 (2014)(citation omitted).  In this case, First Bank itself released the 
Bowling Alley DOT when it voluntarily settled the First Washington Lawsuit and did so at a 
time when its right to foreclose on that Deed of Trust—assuming the secured obligation had not 
been extinguished—was vindicated on appeal.  As its whole claim against Land Title was 
brought later and appears to be  premised on Land Title having caused that deed of trust to be 
improperly released, an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal is proper under I.C. § 12-121.  
“Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action 
to recover on ‘any commercial transaction.’  Commercial transactions are all transactions except 
for personal or household purposes.”  De Groot v. Standley Trenching, Inc., 157 Idaho 557, 566–
67, 338 P.3d 536, 546 (2014).  Where a commercial transaction is the “gravamen of the lawsuit,” 
I.C. § 12-120(3) “compels” an award of attorney fees and costs.  See e.g. Edged In Stone, Inc. v. 
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Nw. Power Sys., LLC, 156 Idaho 176, 181, 321 P.3d 726, 731 (2014). In Goodman, the Court 
equated the gravamen issue to a “but for cause” analysis stating that without the underlying 
commercial transaction, “the lawsuit would not have been brought.” 148 Idaho at 592, 226 P.3d 
at 534.  In this case, Land Title is entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3) because 
First Bank’s claims in this lawsuit arise out of a commercial transaction and such commercial 
transaction is the gravamen of this lawsuit.  At the heart of this lawsuit are the First Bank Loan 
and the Bowling Alley DOT, which were executed as part of a series of commercial lending 
transactions, meriting application of costs and attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3).  
V. CONCLUSION 
Land Title respectfully requests that the decision of the District Court be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22nd day of October, 2018. 
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP 
/s/  Thomas E. Dvorak  
Thomas E. Dvorak 
Counsel for Defendant/Land Title 
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